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MR. JUSTICE EMMETT MATTHEW HALL
By W. KENNETH CAMPBELL*
I am deeply sensible of the honour done me by the editors of Volume 15
of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal when they invited me to write an article
setting forth some of my recollections of the work of Mr. Justice Emmett M.
Hall with the Supreme Court of Canada. This great jurist and distinguished
gentleman was my mentor, guide and good friend for more than ten years
when he laboured at the Court where I was engaged as Executive Secretary
to the Court and Private Secretary to the Chief Justice.
I first met Mr. Justice Hall one morning in 1961 as I was leaving the
office of Prime Minister Diefenbaker. Mr. Justice Hall was sitting in the
anteroom waiting to be shown in to see the Prime Minister. The Appointment
Clerk was a friend of mine and he said to me, "Of course you know Chief
Justice Hall." (He was then Chief Justice of Saskatchewan.) I replied that I
knew him by reputation as an outstanding lawyer and judge and also as
Chairman of the Royal Commission on Health Services, but I had not had
the pleasure of meeting him personally. The Chief Justice and I chatted for a
few minutes, I apologized for keeping him from his appointment with the
Prime Minister and took my leave.
For many years Mr. Justice Hall had been one of the finest counsel in
Saskatchewan. He was constantly before the Courts in that Province and on
numerous occasions he appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada, where
he first appeared in February, 1928. He was appointed Chief Justice of the
Court of Queen's Bench, Saskatchewan in October, 1957 and Chief Justice of
Saskatchewan and of the Court of Appeal in February, 1961. When he was
appointed to the Supreme Court in November, 1962, he had all the experience
necessary to enable him to make a very substantial contribution to the work

of the Court.
The Judge is our only jurist who has the distinction of having been
Chief Justice of a trial division, Chief Justice of a Province and a Judge of
the Supreme Court of Canada.
I next met Mr. Justice Hall when he was sworn in as a Judge of the
Supreme Court of Canada in January, 1963, by Chief Justice Kerwin in the
latter's Chambers. After the ceremony, I was invited to visit the Judge and
his family in his Chambers, and met Mrs. Hall and their son Dr. John Hall,
a renowned orthopaedic surgeon and Harvard graduate, and his wife. That
happy gathering made a lasting impression on me. It was very apparent that
there was a real bond of love, affection and respect in the family. I knew then
that I was going to get along well with the new Judge.
0 Copyright, 1977, W. Kenneth Campbell.
Mr. Campbell served as Private Secretary to five successive Chief Justices of the
Supreme Court of Canada, beginning with Chief Justice Sir Lyman Duff in 1940, and
assumed the additional duties of Executive Secretary to the Court in 1965.
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I hope that I can provide some useful insight into Mr. Justice Hall's
work with the Court. I must say at once that he is a prodigious worker. His
work habits are regular and when he seats himself behind his desk no time is
lost in getting on with the business at hand. Everyone who has been associated
with haim is impressed with his capacity to get things done in a speedy and
orderly manner.
Mr. Justice Hall carried his full workload at the Court. Born in Quebec,
he is bilingual and therefore sat on many appeals from that Province and
in several instances wrote his reasons for judgment in French. I do not think
it is too much to say that during his service with the Court he acquired a
very broad knowledge of the Civil Law of that Province.
Criminal appeals were of great interest to him and he was always seeking
to have justice done. Unless for some special reasons - illness, for example
- the full Court sits on constitutional cases and this branch of the law held
a special attraction for him. Mastering patent law requires a superior
knowledge of mathematics and intense concentration. Mr. Justice Hall sat on
many patent, trademark and copyright appeals and wrote reasons for judgment on most of them.
Space will not permit me to comment on all the important appeals in
which Mr. Justice Hall participated. I have selected five areas which, I trust,
will provide some useful insight into Mr. Justice Hall's work with the Court.
I will accordingly refer briefly to several cases which will illustrate the Judge's
principal concerns.
First, he believed that the Court has a reform function. This was manifested particularly in two cases: Ares v. Venner1 and Pich6 v. The Queen.2
Prior to Ares, hospital patient's records were not received in evidence as such
but only through the testimony of the nurse or person who had actually made
them. The records were treated like any other out-of-court statements
tendered to prove the truth of those statements. The House of Lords in Myers
v. Directorof Public Prosecutions8 stated the common law position to be that
no matter how reliable such documents might be, they would be inadmissible.
In Ares, Justice Hall wrote the judgment of the Court, stating in part:
Hospital records, including nurses' notes, made contemporaneously by someone
having a personal knowledge of the matters then being recorded and under a duty
to make the entry or record should be received in evidence as prima facie proof
of the facts stated therein. This should, in no way, preclude a party wishing to
challenge the accuracy of the records or entries from doing so. Had the respondent here wanted to challenge the accuracy of the nurses' notes, the nurses were
present in court and available to be called as witnesses if the respondent had
so wished.

This demonstrated that the Supreme Court of Canada would not necessarily
follow the House of Lords decision and was free to differ as it saw fit.
Furthermore, it altered in a material way the law as it stood up until that
1 [19701 S.C.R. 608.
2 [1971] S.C.R. 23; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 700.
3 [19651 A.C. 1001.
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time. Hospital records which contained both objective and subjective statements would now be admissible as evidence of the facts contained therein.
In Pich, 4 Mr. Justice Hall had to deal with the time-consuming argument over whether a statement made by an accused to a person in authority
was inculpatory or exculpatory, and whether, therefore, it required a voir
dire. Hall J. writing on behalf of the Court, settled the law in Canada as
follows:
In my view the time is opportune for this Court to say that the admission in
evidence of all statements made by an accused to persons in authority, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, is governed by the same rule and thus put to an end
the continuing controversy and necessary evaluation by trial judges of every such
statement which the Crown proposes to use in chief or on cross-examination as
either being inculpatory or exculpatory. The rule respecting the admission of
statements is a judge-made rule and does not depend upon any legislative foundation and I see no impediment to making the rule clear and beyond dispute.
Mr. Justice Hall was deeply concerned that the little man got a fair
hearing, as the case of Ives v. Manitoba5 illustrates. Mrs. Ives with some
foresight had acquired 140 acres of land for $6,000.00. Within a year the
Province of Manitoba decided it must have 80 acres of her land for Birds
Hill Provincial Park. In the arbitration proceedings Mrs. Ives was awarded
$20,500.00. The Court of Appeal reduced the amount to $12,320.00. Mrs.
Ives appealed to the Supreme Court, and, being without funds to employ
counsel, appeared in person.
I was in Court when she opened with what was a reasonably good
appeal, and I noticed that she was nervous and not doing very well. Mr.
Justice Hall interrupted her to say, "Mrs. Ives, if I understand you correctly
you are putting your case on these grounds and if I am wrong don't hesitate
to say so." He then proceeded to clarify her argument by outlining her strong
points and presenting her case as it should have been done. When he finished,
he asked her if he had properly stated her case. She replied, "Oh yes, Mr.
Justice Hall. Thank you so much, everyone told me that you were a kind
man." The appeal was allowed and the arbitrator's award of $20,500.00
restored with costs to the appellant.
As I stated earlier, Mr. Justice Hall had a great interest in the criminal
appeals which came before the Court. The most famous of these was the
Truscott Reference.6 In 1959, the accused, a boy of fourteen and a half
years, was found guilty by a jury of the murder of a girl of twelve years.
Most of the evidence was circumstantial and the accused did not give
evidence at his trial. The conviction was unanimously affirmed by the Court
of Appeal of Ontario. An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Canada was refused in February, 1960. Six years later, the Governor
General in Council referred the Truscott case to the Supreme Court of
Canada for decision as if it had been appealed under a 1961 amendment to

4 Supra, note 2.

56 [1970] S.C.R. 465.
In the Matter of a Reference re Steven Murray Truscott, [1967] S.C.R. 309.
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the Criminal Code that permitted an appeal as of right in such cases. 7 Nine
judges heard that reference. Eight reported that they were satisfied that
Truscott had been rightly convicted.
Hall J., the lone dissenter, in a lengthy judgment of 42 pages, analysed
the evidence as well as the trial judge's charge to the jury and concluded that
the trial had not been conducted according to law and that Truscott should
be given a new trial. Hall's analysis of the record and his comments have
been widely accepted in the legal profession and law schools as unanswerable and a broad opinion persists that Truscott was wrongly convicted.
R. v. Wray 8 is another case in which Hall J. dissented and where the
majority judgment is held by legal scholars to be in error and one which may
well call for legislative reform to deal with the problem of evidence illegally
obtained and the power of trial judges to reject such evidence.
The case raised the issue, inter alia, of whether a trial judge has
discretion to exclude evidence acquired by means oppressive to the accused.
The majority relied on the decision in Noor Mohamed v. The King9 and held
that the trial judge could only use his discretion to exclude admissible
evidence when it was of great prejudicial effect and of trifling probative value.
Mr. Justice Hall, on the other hand, felt that the discretion in Noor Mohamed
has been expanded in other cases, such as Kuruma v. The Queen' ° to include
the right to exclude evidence which would operate unfairly against a defendant. He felt that this approach recognized a centuries-old general principle
that an accused has a constitutional right to a fair trial. Furthermore,
contrary to the decision of the majority, he stated that once it is established
that the discretion has been judicially exercised by the trial judge, it is not
subject to review or to being weighed on appeal. He held that this was a rule
of general application which should not be breached merely because it might
contribute to a result which an Appeal Court considered undesirable.
Justice Hall was an early judicial supporter of the Canadian Bill of
Rights. While Chief Justice of Saskatchewan, he had said in Shumiatcher v.
Attorney General for Saskatchewan:"
7
In 1960, the Court had jurisdiction to hear criminal appeals only where a judge
of the Court of Appeal had dissented (which was not the case here) or on a question
of law with the leave of the court. In 1961, s. 597A of the Criminal Code was enacted
by S.C. 1960-61, c. 44, s. 11, to permit a person sentenced to death, whose conviction
had been affirmed by the Court of Appeal, to appeal to the Supreme Court as of right
on any question of law, fact, or mixed fact and law. In 1966, the Governor General in
Council referred the following question to the Court pursuant to s. 55 of The Supreme
Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259:
Had an appeal by Steven Murray Truscott been made to the Supreme Court of
Canada as is now permitted by Section 597A of the Criminal Code of Canada,
what disposition would the Court have made of such an appeal on a consideration
of the existing Record and such further evidence as the Court, in its discretion,
may receive and consider?
8 [1971] S.C.R. 272; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673.
9 [19491 A.C. 182.
10 [1955] A.C. 197.
11 (1962), 39 W.W.R. (N.S.) 577.
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It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that an accused person should be
able to tell from the information or indictment the precise nature of the charge
against him. That principle has been carried into the Canadian Bill of Rights,
1960, ch. 44, by sec. 2(e), which reads:
2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of
the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian
Bill of Rights be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or
infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of
any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and
obligations.
The prosecution, acting in the name of the sovereign, is, in my opinion, under a
specific duty not to circumvent or negative this positive injunction of the parliament of Canada. The courts, too, must be vigilant in seeing that the provisions of
the CanadianBill of Rights are not breached, ignored or whittled away.
He concurred with Ritchie I. in R. v. Drybones'2 and in a short judgment wrote:
I agree with the reasons of my brother Ritchie and wish only to add some
observations regarding the decision in Regina v. Gonzales.
The concept that the Canadian Bill of Rights is operative in the fact of a law of
Canada only when that law does not give equality to all persons within the class
to whom that particular law extends or relates, as it was expressed by Tysoe J.A.
at p. 264.
Coming now to sec. 1 (b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. The meaning of
the word "equality" is well known. In my opinion, the word "before" in the
expression "equality before the law," in the sense in which that expression
is used in sec. 1 (b) means "in the presence of." It seems to me this is the key
to the correct interpretation of the expression and makes it clear that
"equality before the law" has nothing to do with the application of the law
equally to everyone and equal laws for everyone in the sense for which
appellant's counsel contends, namely the same laws for all persons, but to
the position occupied by persons to whom a law relates or extends. They
shall be entitled to have the law as it exists applied equally and without fear
or favour to all persons to whom it relates or extends.
is analogous to the position taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896, 163 U.S. 537), and which was wholly rejected by the
same Court in its historic desegregation judgment Brown v. Board of Education
(1953, 347 U.S. 483).
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court had held that under the "separate but equar'
doctrine equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities even though these facilities be separate. In Brown v. Board
of Education, the Court held the "separate but equal" doctrine to be totally
invalid.
The social situations in Brown v. Board of Education and in the instant case are,
of course, very different, but the basic philosophic concept is the same. The
Canadian Bill of Rights is not fulfilled if it merely equates Indians with Indians
in terms of equality before the law, but can have validity and meaning only when
subject to the single exception set out in s. 2 it is seen to repudiate discrimination
in every law of Canada by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex
in respect of the human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in s. 1 in
whatever way that discrimination may manifest itself not only as between Indian
and Indian but as between all Canadians whether Indian or non-Indian.

12

[1970] S.C.R. 282; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473.
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However, in Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell,18 Ritchie J. again
writing for the majority virtually negatived Drybones. Justice Hall considers
Lavell to be a bad judgment and one which the Supreme Court must eventually so characterize.
Mr. Justice Hall believes that while the Courts have an important part
and duty to perform in the field of law reform, Parliament is supreme in that
14
field. He demonstrated this in his judgment in the Breathalizer Reference
when, in concurring with Laskin J., as he then was, he wrote:
Notwithstanding that in my view the Order in Council proclaiming parts only of
s. 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69 (Can.), c. 38, may indicate
on the part of the executive a failure to live up to the spirit of what was intended
by Parliament, I am nevertheless bound to hold that the remedy does not lie with
the Court. Under our system of parliamentary responsible government, the
executive is answerable to Parliament, and when Parliament, by enacting s. 120,
gave the executive a free hand to proclaim "any" of the provisions of the Act
as set out in the English version, 'on l'une ou plusieurs de ses dispositions'
as in the French version, the responsibility for the result rests with Parliament
which has the power to remedy the situation if the executive has actually acted
contrary to its intention.

Two other decisions, in both of which Hall J. was in the minority, are
worthy of note in that the minority view which he put forward has been
subsequently accepted by Parliament as the preferable one in each instance.
In the Kootenay and Elk Railway case' 5 he supported the Canadian Pacific
Railway position that the U.S. Kaiser railway interests along with Burlington
Northern Railway should not be allowed to build a branch line into the
Kootenay coal area to syphon off the lucrative coal carrying business destined
for Japan through Roberts Bank at Vancouver. Mr. Justice Hall had very
strong views in this appeal and wrote a powerful judgment. He was in the
minority in this opinion, but his views were subsequently vindicated when the
Government of British Columbia killed the project.
In the celebrated Nishga Indians land claims case, Calder v. British
Columbia, 6 Hall J. again in a minority position, reviewed aboriginal land
claims in their historical setting in America, Africa and Australia and concluded that there was such a thing as aboriginal rights and that the Nishga
Tribe had not surrendered title to their lands nor had title to these lands been
extinguished in the only way that such extinguishment can be done, namely
by positive legislative action. Prior to Hall's reasoned judgment the Government of Canada had given little credence to the Indians' claim. Following the
judgment, steps have been taken to negotiate the aboriginal claims in the
Yukon, British Columbia and other areas in Canada. Mr. Justice Hall toiled
long and hard on his judgment because there was no doubt in his mind of
the merit of the appeal. The media gave this appeal wide coverage. The
13 [1974] S.C.R. 1349; 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481.
14

In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor General in Council Concerning
the Proclamation of Section 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, [1970]
S.C.R. 777 at 778.
15 Kootenay and Elk Railway Co. et al. v. C.P.R., [1974] S.C.R. 955.
16 [1973] S.C.R. 313.
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Indians of Canada consider Hall's judgment a complete vindication of their
position on aboriginal title.
These judgments will serve to indicate the character and judicial leanings
of Mr. Justice Hall. He has a forceful approach to everything he does, and
has no qualms about expressing his views on any subject which he has studied.
On the Bench he was courteous and helpful to counsel. He disliked an appeal
that was not properly prepared and presented. On occasions when counsel
were unduly repetitious, he would say in a sharp voice, "Mr.
,I
understood you perfectly the first time you made that point." Counsel, if he
knew Mr. Justice Hall, would then proceed to his next point. He sought
perfection, because the litigant deserved nothing less. Mr. Justice Hall was
prepared to differ with his colleagues on the Bench, in the Conference Room,
and in their Chambers. But those differences were soon forgotten and he bore
no malice at any time.
Mr. Justice Hall has stated publicly on more than one occasion that the
law ought not to remain static, that it must breathe, live and continue to
advance to meet the changing conditions of our present day society. His
reasons for judgment reflect his thinking in this respect; he will be remembered as a libertarian judge. I think that Chief Justice Laskin would not take
issue with my observation that he and Mr. Justice Hall approach legal and
social problems in the same fashion. When they were assigned to sit on the
same appeal they usually agreed in the conclusion.
I have already mentioned that Mr. Justice Hall was Chairman of the
Royal Commission on Health Services. There is also the Hall-Dennis Commission on Aims and Objectives of Education in Ontario; his appointment
as sole arbitrator following the railway strike in 1973; and his most recent
appointment in 1975 as Chairman of the Commission on Grain Handling and
Transportation. In addition to these onerous tasks, he has served as
Chancellor of Guelph University for two three-year terms.
If I may be forgiven, I would like to note that Mr. Justice Hall invited
me to come out of retirement to assist him with his work in the Railway
Arbitration and the Commission on Grain Handling and Transportation. I
am confident that these invitations were prompted by the fact that he had
confidence in my ability to discharge my duties in a satisfactory manner.
However, I am also persuaded that our friendship was a deciding factor in
his decision.
I take much pride in the fact that I have been privileged to be associated
with Mr. Justice Hall. I shall always remember him as a scholar, gentleman,
brilliant jurist and unforgettable friend.

